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KILLING A CHICKEN TO SCARE THE MONKEY: THE
UNEQUAL ADMINISTRATION OF DEATH IN CHINA
Jessica J. Shen †
Abstract:
China’s frequent usage of the death penalty in order to achieve
deterrence of crime is well known to the international community; however, China also
has a strong tradition of legal mercy stemming from imperial rule. In turn, imperial legal
mercy originated from Confucian values of benevolence and humaneness. Although
modern China emerged as a rejection of Imperial China’s Confucian hierarchal social
structures, these cultural traditions have endured. For example, Confucianism’s humane
influence can be seen in statutory and procedural mechanisms demonstrating benevolence
towards criminals. However, only applying this benevolence to a select group of people
betrays modern China’s statutory and political objectives of egalitarianism and is
inconsistent with Imperial China’s use of legal mercy.
China creates a contradiction in its criminal justice system when it grants legal
mercy for corrupt government officials but not for those convicted of other serious crimes.
Although China has made great strides in curtailing death penalty sentences, only
exercising benevolence toward a certain group of people contradicts the cultural,
philosophical, and legal principles of benevolence and egalitarianism. As a result, if legal
mercy is applied to anyone, it must be applied to all, not just those with political power.
The current usage of legal mercy for corrupt officials should be instructive for moving
towards a more merciful system for all.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In July 2013, China’s former Railways Minister, Liu Zhijun, was
given a suspended death sentence for corruption and abuse of power,
including accepting bribes totaling more than USD 10 million over twentyfive years in exchange for government rail contracts. 1 The high-speed
railway network under Liu Zhijun’s purview experienced numerous safety
scandals involving a series of accidents.2 In July 2011, a train crash in
Wenzhou killed forty people due to design flaws and lax security standards.3
This scandal is merely one example in a pattern of corruption stemming
from China’s transition into a market economy in the 1980s, which increased
the typical citizen’s standard of living and granted local officials an
†

Jessica J. Shen is a 2015 J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law. She
received her B.A. from the University of Washington in 2012. The author would like to thank her faculty
advisor, Professor Mary Fan, University of Washington School of Law, and the editorial staff at the Pacific
Rim Law & Policy Journal.
1
China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23222240 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
2
Id.
3
China Bullet Train Crash ‘Caused by Design Flaws’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-16345592 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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enormous amount of power that many exploited for financial gain.4 Since
then, China has been plagued with abuses of power by hundreds of officials
at high levels of government, including provincial vice-governor and viceminister.5 Between December 2012 and June 2013, almost 2,300 officials
have been penalized for graft and wasteful spending.6 As the most high
profile official to be found guilty of corruption under Xi Jinping’s
administration, Liu’s conviction coincides with Xi Jinping’s pledge to crack
down on corruption, taking on the “powerful ‘tigers’ at the top to the ‘flies’
at the bottom of the Communist Party.”7 Indeed, Liu Zhijun’s indictment
alleged that his negligence led to huge losses of public assets as well as
damage to state and citizen interests.8 Although the law permitted a death
penalty sentence for extreme corruption, 9 the court showed Liu Zhijun
mercy in issuing a suspended death sentence because those are generally
commuted to life imprisonment.10 Liu Zhijun’s suspended death sentence is
merely one example of a trend where Chinese courts take “a different
approach” in sentencing corrupt government officials compared with the
general population.11
China’s leniency towards corrupt government officials stands in stark
contrast with the vast amount of people executed in general. Although the
Chinese government classifies the full scope of its death penalty usage as a
state secret, even official statistics chronicle increasing numbers of
executions throughout the 1990s. 12 This trend has continued into the
twenty-first century; since at least 2005, China has had the most confirmed
executions in the world.13 Amnesty International reported that China likely
executed between 1000 to 2000 people a year between 2005 and 2013, but
4

Ji Zhebu, Officials: A Matter of Faith, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://usa.chinadaily.com.
cn/epaper/2013-10/10/content_17021185.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
5
Tang Yue et al., New Study Reveals Corruption Pattern, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://english.people.com.cn/90785/8373734.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014); see Eliminating Corruption is
CPC’s Long-Term Task, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (July 4, 2013), http://english.people.com.
cn/90785/8311677.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
6
Zhou Wenting, ‘Guilty Officials Should be Charged’, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (China) (June 14,
2013), http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8284829.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
7
China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, supra note 1.
8
Id.
9
See Mimi Lau, Death Penalty in China Linked to Social Inequality, Says Critics, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1328159/death-penalty-chinalinked-social-inequality-say-critics (last visited May 6, 2014).
10
China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, supra note 1.
11
See Mimi Lau, supra note 9.
12
Peter Nestor, When the Price is Too High: Rethinking China’s Deterrence Strategy for Robbery,
16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 525, 535 (2007).
13
See The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-international-perspective (last visited May 6, 2014).
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because death penalty figures are a state secret the total number may be
much higher.14 In March 2004, Chinese media published an unofficial report
finding that the courts sentence 10,000 people to death every year in China,
not including people sentenced to death with two-year suspensions.15 The
Dui Hua Foundation16 estimated that China executed as many as 12,000
people in 2002, 8000 people in 2005, 6500 people in 2007, 4000 people in
2012,17 and 3000 people in 2013.18 In contrast, Iran—the country with the
second greatest number of executions between 2005 and 2013—executed at
most around 388 people a year.19 Additionally, while the United States
executed a total of 1373 people since 1976,20 official statistics reveal that
China executed 6100 people in 1996 alone. 21
China continues to execute a large numbers of criminals because of
the longstanding belief that the death penalty serves as an effective deterrent
to crime.22 In fact, common sayings include “executing one deters one
hundred”23 and “killing a chicken to scare the monkey.”24 Not only do most
Chinese citizens believe that the death penalty carries strong educational
value, but the government utilizes the death penalty as a matter of public
policy.25 Judicial officials often defend China’s usage of the death penalty
by stating that the “nation is at a stage of development where the death
penalty is necessary as a deterrent.”26 For example, one Chinese high court
official said that deterrence is the goal because “by killing one, we educate
one hundred.”27 However, there is no convincing evidence that the death
penalty is an effective deterrent.28
14

See id.
JIANFU CHEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA: COMMENTARY AND LEGISLATION 49 (Gabi Duigu eds., 2013).
16
Dui Hua is a nonprofit organization promoting the recognition of human rights in China. About
Dui Hua, THE DUI HUA FOUNDATION, http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=185 (last visited May 6, 2014).
17
Criminal Justice, THE DUI HUA FOUNDATION, http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=136 (last visited
May 6, 2014).
18
The Death Penalty in China, DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE, http://www.deathpenalty
worldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=China#f33-2 (last visited May 6, 2014).
19
The Death Penalty: An International Perspective, supra note 13.
20
U.S.
Executions
Since
1976,
THE
CLARK
COUNTY
PROSECUTING
ATT’Y,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm (last visited May 6, 2014).
21
Nestor, supra note 12, at 535.
22
Shanhe Jiang et al., Death Penalty Views in China, Japan and the U.S.: An Empirical Comparison,
38 J. CRIM. JUST. 862, 864 (2010); Bin Liang, et al., Sources of Variation in Pro-Death Penalty Attitudes in
China, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 119, 121-22 (2006).
23
Shanhe Jiang et al., supra note 22, at 864.
24
Id.
25
See id.
26
Mimi Lau, supra note 9.
27
Id.
28
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2012), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NatResCouncil-Deterr.pdf; EDITORIALS: Evidence Does Not
15
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Based on known statistics China executed about 1.5% of its 1350
million person population in 2012;29 however, this comment does not focus
on China’s general usage of the death penalty. Rather, it addresses the
contradiction created in the Chinese criminal justice system when China
grants legal mercy for corrupt government officials but not for those
convicted of other serious crimes. Information on the exact number of death
penalty sentences and how many are imposed for particular crimes is
“incomplete and unreliable” because the government considers it a state
secret.30 However, reports from both within China and in the international
community raise concerns about the link between China’s death penalty
usage and social inequality.31 In particular, the news media have noted a
judicial trend granting lighter punishments for government officials or
politically connected individuals, but not for those without political power. 32
Although China has recently made great strides in attempting to curtail the
total number of death penalty sentences, 33 only exercising benevolence
toward a certain group of people contradicts China’s cultural, philosophical,
and legal principles of benevolence and egalitarianism.
China’s extensive tradition of legal mercy balances out the belief that
the death penalty deters crime.34 The Confucian principle of benevolence
that encouraged humaneness in the criminal justice system was prominent in
imperial China and survives today,35 despite attacks on Confucianism in
recent Chinese history.36 In particular, Confucian benevolence manifests in
the lenient features of Chinese criminal law,37 especially restorative practices
such as mediation38 and community-based corrections,39 as well as the focus
on balancing leniency and rigidity in criminal justice policies.40 Despite its
Support Death Penalty As Deterrent, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
editorials-evidence-does-not-support-death-penalty-deterrent (last visited Apr. 8, 2014); Bin Liang, supra
note 22, at 121-22.
29
See 2012 World Population Data Sheet,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
http://www.prb.org/pdf12/2012-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf (last visited May 6, 2014); The Death
Penalty: An International Perspective, supra note 13.
30
Nestor, supra note 12, at 535.
31
See, e.g., Mimi Lau, supra note 9.
32
Id.
33
See infra Part IV.A
34
Jianhong Liu et al., Chinese Legal Traditions: Punitiveness Versus Mercy, 9 ASIA PAC. J. POLICE
& CRIM. JUST. 17, 22 (2012).
35
Id. at 24.
36
See id.
37
Id. at 24.
38
Victim-offender mediation is often practiced to seek a settlement in less severe or misdemeanor
cases. Id. at 25. It requires the voluntary participation of the offender and victim, compliance with the
relevant laws and regulations, and that either party can suspend mediation to seek formal trial. Id.
39
Id. at 26.
40
Id. at 27.
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extremely high number of executions, China recently made efforts to curb its
use of the death penalty, 41 to debatable effect. 42 However, the general
consensus that use of the death penalty deters crime still drives court
convictions.43 Given that more executions likely do not achieve deterrence44
and the deep-rooted influence of Confucian legal mercy, it would better
serve both Chinese cultural traditions and the goal of deterrence to apply
benevolence to everyone, not just corrupt government officials.
Part II of this comment explains why deterrence cannot justify harsh
death penalty policies. Part III describes the endurance of the traditional
Confucian value of benevolence through balancing severity and mercy. In
particular, this demonstrates the importance of preserving legal mercy in
modern Chinese law. Part IV argues that failing to apply legal mercy to all
criminals creates a philosophical and legal contradiction. This inequality
betrays both Communist China’s goal of an egalitarian society and
Confucian benevolence. Finally, Part V posits the following solutions to
resolve this inequality: 1) publishing Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”)
guidance cases so lower courts may better determine which cases are severe
enough to warrant the death penalty, 2) mandating greater usage of
mitigation factors when considering a potential death penalty case, and 3)
establishing a formal clemency procedure.
II.

THE DEATH PENALTY DOES NOT DETER CRIMES

Crimes rates over the past twenty-five years reveal the ineffectiveness
of China’s current deterrence strategy,45 even official statistics reveal that
crime rates have risen dramatically since the early 1980s.46 The Government
initiated a national “Strike Hard” campaign as a response to this increase in
crime,47 which led to widespread and extreme applications of the death
penalty. 48 This campaign encompassed mass arrests, rapid and harsh
sentencing, mass rallies, and propaganda.49 Though it began with the strong
41

See Na Jiang, A Comparison of Wrongful Convictions in Death Penalty Cases Between China and
the United States, 41 INT’L J.L. CRIME & JUST. 144, 151-52 (2013); Margaret K. Lewis, Leniency and
Severity in China’s Death Penalty Debate, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 303, 306 (2011).
42
See, e.g., Chris Hogg, China Ends Death Penalty for 13 Economic Crimes, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12580504 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
43
See infra Part III.
44
See supra text accompanying note 28.
45
Nestor, supra note 12, at 525-26.
46
Id. at 526.
47
See Børge Bakken, Moral Panics, Crime Rates and Harsh Punishment in China, 37 AUSTL. & N.Z.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 67, 69 (2004).
48
Nestor, supra note 12, at 539.
49
Id.
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Legalist belief that harsh punishments deter crime, this strategy failed.50 The
government attempted nationwide “Strike Hard” campaigns from 1983 to
1987, as well as in 1996,51 but each campaign failed to reduce the crime
rate.52 In fact, the largest spikes in crime between 1981 and 2001 occurred
soon after “Strike Hard” campaigns.53 Chinese scholars note that focusing
solely on severe punishments was a “futile strategy” to deter crime that
resulted in a waste of law enforcement resources and prevented police from
implementing crime prevention tactics.54 In particular, preventive social
order management activities such as patrolling, strengthening neighborhood
resident groups, and managing guns “slip by the wayside” because local
police are under “terrific pressure from above to show statistical results.”55
Instead, law enforcement personnel focus their energy “almost exclusively”
on investigation, attacks, and arrests in order to adhere to the “Strike Hard”
campaign’s mandate. 56 In hindsight, the “Strike Hard” campaigns
significantly increased the number of capital sentences.
Although there is much debate over whether the death penalty actually
deters crime, 57 research examining homicide rates in the United States
demonstrates that factors other than the death penalty explain the rise and
fall of crime rates.58 California, New York, and Texas all experienced a rise
in homicides in the late 1970s and late 1980s, before the rates declined
dramatically.59 From 1974 to 2009, all three states’ homicide rates “tracked
virtually identically.”60 However, while Texas executed 447 people during
that period, California only executed thirteen people and New York executed
no one.61
Like the United States, China witnessed an increase in crime in the
late 1980s.62 The parallel data can be attributed to the demographics of
juveniles at the time: as China’s juvenile delinquency rate rose, babyboomers entered the age range of fourteen to twenty-five, the age range in
which people are statistically most likely to commit crimes.63 Not only did
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 527.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 539, 540-41.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 2.
See EDITORIALS: Evidence Does Not Support Death Penalty as Deterrent, supra note 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nestor, supra note 12, at 526.
Bakken, supra note 47, at 68-69.
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the population of fourteen to twenty-five year-olds rise dramatically from
120 million to 272 million between 1965 and 1987, but the juvenile crime
rate decreased from seventy-six percent in 1988 to forty-two percent in
2001. 64 The decline in juvenile crime correlates with the baby-boomer
generation aging out of that fourteen to twenty-five year-old range.65 As a
result, the passage of time is the probable explanation for the rise and fall of
crime rates in China, not the frequency with which the government invoked
the death penalty.
The absence of correlation between the increased usage of the death
penalty and a decrease in crime demonstrates that, at the very least, officials
should not use the death penalty specifically to deter crime. If the Chinese
government is willing to attempt reforms for the economic crimes of corrupt
public officials, 66 then it must also improve sentencing procedures to
properly exercise the principle of benevolence for everyone else. Otherwise,
punishing ordinary citizens without political power under the guise of
deterring serious violent crime betrays China’s philosophical, political, and
legal traditions.
III.

THE REEMERGENCE OF TRADITIONAL CONFUCIAN VALUES
DETERRENCE THROUGH SEVERITY AND MERCY IN MODERN CHINA

OF

The current Chinese criminal justice system focuses heavily on
deterrence through punitive measures.67 From 2006 to 2012, forty million
nightly viewers watched the Chinese television series “Interviews Before
Execution,” where controversial death row inmates such as a couple who
killed the boyfriend’s grandmother spoke with “in-your-face” host Ding Yu
about their crimes. 68 During these interviews, Ding Yu propagated the
show’s mission to deter crime by insulting inmates, informing them that they
were dangers to society, and telling one man that his family had no interest
in seeing him before he died.69 The government approved the show as a
potential crime deterrent because it showed the “misery that awaits” those

64

Id. at 69.
Id.
66
Ji Zhebu, Crime and Punishment for Corrupt Officials, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-08/29/content_16929435.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
67
See Lewis, supra note 41, at 304.
68
Forty million viewers is almost half of Henan Province’s population and 1.25 times the number of
Americans who watched the closing ceremonies of the Olympic. Caitlin Dewey, In China, Death Row
Entertainment is Nothing New, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/01/in-china-death-row-entertainment-is-nothing-new/.
69
Id.
65
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who face the death penalty.70 The head of the television channel stated that
it was good for society because the government “want[s] the audience to be
warned . . . if they are warned, tragedies might be averted.”71 Although the
current attitude toward the use of the death penalty is changing, the majority
of Chinese citizens still believe it effectively deters crime.72
Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911, the Chinese
government’s ideological goals and values have been in flux, 73 often
adjusting depending on the current political, social, and economic context.74
Communist China initially rejected Confucianism, but since the late 1970s,
traditional Chinese teachings have resurfaced, ironically, to generate loyalty
and preserve Party structures.75 Although modern China rejected imperial
traditions,76 the “umbilical cord between the Confucian tradition and modern
China . . . cannot be easily severed.”77 Due to its status as China’s official
ideology from the second century AD to the early twentieth century,
Confucianism functioned as the dominant source of Chinese cultural
principles.78 Confucian principles are so incorporated in Chinese society
that even anti-Confucian movements such as the May Fourth Movement and
the Cultural Revolution did not “radically alter” these internalized
elements. 79 In fact, lawmakers ratified benevolent principles, such as
mitigating factors, into the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
(hereinafter “Criminal Law”). 80 Confucian principles of mercy and
70

Mark McDonald, On a New TV Show in China, Cue the Firing Squad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/on-a-new-tv-show-in-china-cue-the-firing-squad/?_r=0.
71
Id.
72
See Shanhe Jiang et al., supra note 22, at 866.
73
See generally, William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U.
L. REV. 707, 707-35 (1985).
74
Bin Liang et al., supra note 22, at 120.
75
Party leaders opposed Confucianism’s historical link with hierarchies. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL
TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 308 (2007). Communist China “radically
rejected Confucianism, seeing it as the root of China’s malaise and inferiority.” LI-HSIANG LISA ROSENLEE,
CONFUCIANISM AND WOMEN: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2007). China also carried out a purge
of Confucianism during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Id.
76
See
XIANFA
pmbl.
(1982)
(China),
available
at
http://english.people.com.cn/
constitution/constitution.html (stating that “[t]he Revolution of 1911 . . . abolished the feudal monarchy and
gave birth to the Republic of China. But the Chinese people had yet to fulfill their historical task of
overthrowing imperialism and feudalism. After waging hard . . . [they] overthrew the rule of imperialism,
feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism . . . and founded the People’s Republic of China.”).
77
Hang Lin, On Being Confucians? Confucian Traditions, and the Modern Chinese Society, 4
EXCURSIONS, 1, 7 (2013).
78
Ying Zhu, The Confucian Tradition and Chinese Television Today, N.Y. TIMES (April 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-media-003.html.
79
Id.
80
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar.
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benevolence also exist in various legal provisions and criminal justice
system practices such as mediation81 and community correction.82 Although
initially thrown out as a source of social inequality, traditional Confucian
values and ideology “remain a driving force in Communist China even
without official recognition.”83 Not only did A) Imperial China utilize a
balance of severity and legal mercy as an essential component of its criminal
justice system, but B) this tradition of legal mercy endures despite recent
attempts to eradicate all traces of Confucianism from modern China.
A.

Imperial China Utilized a Balance of Legalist Severity and Confucian
Humaneness in Its Criminal Justice System to Achieve Deterrence

Criminal law formed the basis of China’s ancient legal system.84
Since Imperial Chinese law intended to “control undesirable social behavior
as well as change people’s hearts,”85 lawmakers sought to deter crime.86 The
emphasis on deterrence in Imperial China’s criminal justice system stems
from the combined influence of Confucianism and Legalism on Imperial
China’s customary legal thought. 87
Confucianism advocates legal
88
humanism, believing that the social order could be maintained with
“exemplary conduct” by the emperor89 and “willingness to compromise” by
the people.90 Even when people broke the law, Confucianism dictated that
the punishment be appropriate to the educational reform of the individual.91
On the other hand, the Legalist school of thought contends that only extreme
brutality and torture deters crime.92 Although Chinese emperors ostensibly
acted on their beliefs that harsh punishments deter crime,93 Confucianism’s
14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 17-19, 49 (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.
81
Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34, at 24.
82
Id. at 26.
83
XIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE, AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN CHINA 48 (1997).
84
See Duan Xiaosong, Criminal Liability of Arbitrators in China: Analysis and Proposals for
Reform, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 2, 33-34 (2014).
85
XIN REN, supra note 83, at 42.
86
Confucius advocated education as a means of preventing crime. Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34,
at 21.
87
LiYing Li & Yue Ma, Adjudication and Legal Reforms in Contemporary China, 26 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 36, 37 (2010).
88
See Hong Lu & Lening Zhang, Death Penalty in China: The Law and the Practice, 33 J. CRIM.
JUST. 367, 367 (2005).
89
Id. at 368.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Børge Bakken, China, a Punitive Society?, 6 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 33, 36, 38 (2011).
93
Bin Liang et al., supra note 22, at 120.
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emphasis on benevolence and humanism often led to mitigation of the
punishment’s severity, as well as amnesties.94 As a result, throughout its
long history, Imperial China did not rely on the rule of law to maintain
order. Instead, it utilized Confucianism and Legalism as a “double source of
authority” in which the former’s focus on self-regulated morality and
behavior was thought to provide enough incentive to avoid the latter’s
ruthless punishments. 95 Thus, Imperial Chinese law only applied to
individuals who did not adhere to Confucianism’s code of ethics, which
emphasized social harmony above all else.96 The law did not protect civil
liberties, because individual rights were not as important as harmony.97
Even though deterrence remained the ultimate goal,98 there was also a
strong tradition of mercy, flexibility, and compassion in Imperial China.99
Authorities’ methods of achieving deterrence were more varied.100 Officials
in Imperial China extensively exercised legal mercy, which stemmed from
Confucian principles.101 Official records document thousands of amnesties
granted to “the whole empire,”102 including pardoning criminals, commuting
their sentences, and extending “special benefits to reabsorb [them] back into
the society.”103 Not only did this practice enable emperors to represent
themselves as merciful and just, but it also “demonstrated the redemptive
power of the Confucian morality and humanitarianism.”104 As a result, legal
mercy mitigated Legalism’s harsh punishments to create a balanced use of
the double source of authority105 in order to deter crime.106 In fact, some
analysts contend that early modern Western Europe used the death penalty
and torture more frequently and publically than Imperial China. 107
Additionally, a Tang Dynasty emperor briefly abolished the death penalty
from 747 to 759 AD.108 The regularity of granting ordinary amnesties that
reduced criminal penalties as well as “great acts of mercy” 109 varied
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Bakken, supra note 92, at 38.
LiYing Li & Yue Ma, supra note 87, at 37.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Bakken, supra note 92, at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
SRINI SITARAMAN, STATE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIMES 222 (2013).
Id.
See LiYing Li & Yue Ma, supra note 87, at 37.
See Bakken, supra note 92, at 38.
Id. at 36, 37.
Id.
“Great acts of mercy” completely forgave an individual for their crime. Id. at 38.
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depending on the dynasty, but Imperial China consistently practiced each
until the end of imperial rule110 in 1911.111
Imperial law generally ignored the offender’s mental condition, but
officials utilized mitigating factors such as the offender’s pregnancy, age, or
disability in granting mercy or remission of the penalty.112 The application
of mercy depended on the Confucian tradition of moral selfinternalization.113 In other words, if a criminal voluntarily surrendered,
admitted guilt, and demonstrated repentance, authorities would grant him
mercy.114 Imperial China’s criminal justice system emphasized waiting a
reasonable period of time for repentance or confession so people could
reflect on the nature and consequences of their actions.115 This principle
even allowed criminals to be tried for fleeing from the authorities rather than
for their original crime if they were captured by authorities before the time
limit for reflection expired.116
Confucianism’s “profound impact on the ancient Chinese legal
system” as a source of Imperial China’s tradition of mercy can be seen in the
gradual adoption of more lenient means of dealing with criminal cases after
the Western Han Dynasty.117 Emperor Han Wen Di (180-157 BC) abolished
corporeal punishment during his reign after the case of “Ti Ying saving her
father.” 118 When Ti Ying’s father committed a crime deserving the
punishment of having his nose cut off, Ti Ying appealed to the emperor by
arguing that a person could not recover from such a punishment119 and
offered herself as a slave in exchange for mercy.120 Ti Ying’s filial piety
compelled the emperor to abolish all corporal punishment.121 Deterrence
“was always the goal of punishment,”122 but Imperial China also utilized
“more elaborate means to supplement such deterrence by benevolence.”123
Thus, although deterrence remained the main priority in determining
110
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punishments, 124 the frequent use of legal mercy in Imperial China
demonstrates that the Chinese legal tradition never advocated for only
granting the harshest punishments in order to achieve deterrence.
B.

Confucianism’s Influence Remains Embedded in Chinese Law and
Culture Despite Prior Anti-Confucian Movements

Some scholars contend that Confucianism’s benevolence and Imperial
China’s exercise of legal mercy have been lost in modern society.125 In
1949, the Communist Party’s victory in the Chinese Civil War initiated a
philosophical severance with Confucianism.126 In spite of this severance,
Confucianism has “a profound influence in shaping Chinese legal thinking
and criminal justice practices,”127 which is reflected in the current trend of
handling a large portion of minor criminal cases through extra-legal means,
such as mediation.128 Therefore, the main themes of Legalist severity and
Confucian benevolence still resonate in current Chinese criminal law.129
1.

The Communist Party of China Explicitly and Violently Rejects
Confucian Principles

After the Communists came into power in 1949, “the old legal
machinery was officially abolished and condemned as a political accessory
of the . . . regime that had suppressed and exploited the working class.”130
The Communist Party attempted to sever China’s “innate connection” with
Confucianism by emphasizing the philosophy’s elitism and political
hierarchy.131 Initially, Marxism exerted a humanizing influence on China’s
criminal justice system because Marxism viewed the death penalty as a cruel
punishment that should be abolished. 132 The Communist Party even
formally suggested that the death penalty be abolished in 1922.133 However,
this view lost influence during the subsequent periods of war and
revolution. 134 Criminal law became an “important weapon for class
struggle,” particularly through severe punishments for those people
124
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126
127
128
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130
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considered enemies of the state.135 The Communist Party had no incentive
to use legal mercy because China’s penal law primarily sought to “suppress
the enemies and protect the people.”136 Although Chinese-Marxist discourse
frowned upon the use of the death penalty, the new regime continued to use
it, claiming that it was necessary “at this stage of development.”137
Mao Zedong’s political and societal sway during the Cultural
Revolution, from 1966 to 1976,138 also contributed to the declining influence
of Confucian legal mercy in modern Chinese criminal law. Although Mao
Zedong viewed the death penalty as a limited tool to be used against
counter-revolutionaries, he nevertheless advocated that the people take
revenge upon their former oppressors through executions.139 Mao Zedong
justified this position by citing the death penalty’s deterrent and punitive
effects, asserting that, “it is necessary to create terror for a while in every
rural area”140 to constrain the landlords’ exercise of power, as well as to
“assuage the people’s anger.” 141 During this period, mercy acquired a
negative connotation; one Cultural Revolution slogan stated that “to show
mercy to the enemy is to show cruelty to the masses.”142 Mao Zedong’s
framing of the Cultural Revolution as a battle between friends and enemies
of the people transformed the revolution’s understanding of crime from
something merely prohibited by the state to something deviant and evil.143
Even after the Cultural Revolution, the government had little use for
Confucian mercy, because the death penalty became a “visible means of
social control” largely driven by political, social, and economic
conditions.144 The government framed the 1983 “Strike Hard” campaign as
a response to increased criminal activity. 145 However, it was truly meant to
suppress unruly youth and reinforce the party’s legitimacy by proving that
the government was in control of the negative social consequences of its
economic reforms.146 During this period, more crimes became punishable
by death and provincial courts obtained the power of the Supreme People’s
135
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Court to reevaluate death penalty sentences.147 Many have been troubled by
“wrongful convictions and inconsistent imposition” of the death penalty by
provincial courts. 148 Thus, allowing provincial courts to review these
sentences resulted in an increased number of executions.149 Additionally,
authorities played up the inflated crime rates, but in actuality, China’s crime
rates in 1983 were the lowest since 1979 and among the lowest in the
world.150 Simultaneously, judicial corruption and the ambiguous wording in
the Criminal Law led to a rash of inconsistent and unjust sentences,
frequently including executions for petty crimes, such as car theft, purse
snatching, and infamously, pinching a woman’s buttocks.151
The absence of legal mercy also caused the government to focus its
usage of the death penalty on portions of the population without political
power. Although officials exaggerated the overall crime rate, juvenile crime
rates did rise, making juvenile gangs the primary targets.152 Authorities
executed gang members as young as sixteen, but these sentences did not
deter crime because gang networks multiplied. 153 The government also
worried about increases in economic crime, but anti-crime campaigns
particularly targeted juvenile gang leaders rather than corrupt officials or
businessmen. 154 This reaction can be attributed to “moral panic about
disorderly youth in a rapidly changing society,”155 a moral panic brought
about by the destruction wrought by Mao Zedong’s teenage Red Guards
during the Cultural Revolution that ended in 1976. 156 With his fears
exacerbated by the rise in juvenile crime, Party Leader Deng Xiaoping
concluded that public executions would be the “indispensable means”
through which the public would be educated on the consequences of not
following party policy. 157 However, instead of deterring crime, China’s
crime rate rose dramatically after the early 1980s, right when the “Strike
Hard” campaign began, and the number of death sentences carried out
peaked at 6100 in 1996.158 By initiating national “Strike Hard” campaigns
that primarily targeted youths, the government rejected Confucianism and
147
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embraced the death penalty as the primary means of deterrence and social
control, a strategy that ultimately did not achieve the desired results.159
2.

Confucianism’s Influence Endures in Current Mechanisms of Legal
Mercy and Political Principles, Despite Attempts to Eradicate It

Although the rehabilitation of Confucianism has been slow within the
Communist Party,160 the Chinese government recently “provided qualified
support for the Confucius revival.”161 In 2007, former President Hu Jintao
promoted a series of official slogans with Confucian undertones, such as
“harmonious development.”162 Additionally, more people study Confucius’
works, and the Party publicly supports Confucius’ philosophy by sponsoring
commemorations of Confucius and embracing Confucian values even at the
Party’s administrative levels.163 This resurgence can be attributed to people
seeking “ways to adapt to a culture in which corruption has spread and
materialism has become a driving value” 164 —two issues President Xi
Jinping pledged to tackle in his current campaign against corruption.165
Political corruption greatly contributed to the widening income gap and was
the “root cause of its disintegrating social safety net and the prevailing
political apathy.”166 In other words, the Chinese people seek a body of
ethical principles that will, as President Xi Jinping puts it,
“promot[e]…morality across society . . . [and stress] the importance of
cultural prosperity.” 167 These principles include an emphasis on order,
balance and harmony, as well as respect for authority and concern for
others.168

159

See supra Part II.
Confucius Makes a Comeback, ECONOMIST (May 17, 2007), http://www.economist.com/
node/9202957.
161
Dexter Roberts, Confucius Makes a Comeback in China, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-01/confucius-makes-a-comeback-in-china.
162
Id.; Confucius Makes a Comeback, supra note 160.
163
See Maureen Fan, Confucius Making a Comeback in Money-Driven Modern China, WASH. POST
(July 24, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/23/AR200707230
1859.html (noting that in one county of Henan Province, officials seeking promotions are evaluated by
friends, relatives, co-workers, and members of the public on how well they care for their parents. Thus,
whether or not they get a promotion depends on how well they embody the Confucian values of filial piety
and family responsibility).
164
Id.
165
See China Ex-Rail Minister Given the Suspended Death Sentence, supra note 1.
166
Ying Zhu, supra note 78.
167
Xinhua Insight: China Sees Renewed Enthusiasm for Confucius, XINHUANET (Dec. 7, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/07/c_132949742.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).
168
Confucius Makes a Comeback, supra note 160.
160

884

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 3

Although the rise of Communism eradicated the social and political
structure of traditional Confucianism, its principles “remain inherent in
Chinese psychology and underline East Asian people’s attitude and
behavior.”169 Marxism’s status as a new political ideology necessitated a
pre-existing foundation upon which its principles could be successfully
absorbed into Chinese culture. 170 Confucianism’s “long inculcation”
allowed for an easier adoption of Marxism-Leninism, particularly since the
Marxist atheist tradition focusing on changing the present world “is
analogous to the Confucian secular thinking of world harmony.”171
Elements of Confucianism still exist in present Communist doctrines
and principles, or implicitly in the underlying structure of society.172 For
example, Confucian benevolent principles can be seen in the Criminal Law’s
prohibition against executing children under eighteen and women who are
pregnant at the time of trial.173 Article 67 of the Criminal Law reflects the
Confucian practice of exercising mercy to those who confess and repent,174
which provides that someone who voluntarily surrenders and truthfully
confesses to their crime “may be given a lighter or mitigated punishment.”175
A “relatively minor” crime may also be exempted from punishment
completely.176
Additionally, Confucian legal mercy endures in formal mechanisms
emphasizing education through benevolence rather than severity.
Confucianism advocates education as a means of deterrence.177 Likewise,
mediation stems from Confucian principles because the process seeks to
restore a broken relationship by respecting the feelings and humanity of both
the victim and the offender. 178 Additionally, in 2003 the Chinese
government officially adopted community correction and initiated pilot
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programs in six provinces and municipalities. 179 After prisons release
criminals on parole, they can serve out the rest of their sentence through
community service. 180 Similarly, community correction centers provide
temporary accommodation and skills training for people who leave prison
with little support system. 181 The Sunshine Midway House in Beijing,
designed to accommodate 5000 people, refers to attendants as “trainees” to
“ensure their human dignity.” 182 Since then, the successful practice of
community corrections, which “reflects the restorative values of . . .
traditional Confucianism in building a harmonious society,” continues to
expand. 183 Community correction programs expanded to all thirty-one
Chinese provinces in 2009.184
Finally, just as Imperial China balanced Legalist severity and
Confucian mercy, the current “integration of leniency and rigidity” acts as
the “basic criminal justice policy in China.”185 Members of the October
2006 Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China clearly advocated this stance by suggesting
reforms of the juvenile justice system and expansion of the community
correction mechanisms.186 Even the Sunshine Halfway House recognizes
that they must provide both warmth and seriousness towards their trainees
because “community correction is still a form of penalty.”187 The Chinese
Criminal Law frequently uses terms such as minor, relatively minor,
relatively serious, and particularly serious to denote mitigation and
aggravation factors.188 This all indicates that Chinese criminal law does
include Confucian principles of benevolence.
IV.

APPLYING LEGAL MERCY TO A SELECT GROUP OF PEOPLE CREATES
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRADICTION AND PRACTICAL INCONSISTENCIES

A

Given the fundamental Confucian principle of benevolence and the
frequent use of legal mercy for all types of crimes in Imperial China,189 the
179
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Confucian principles inherent to Chinese society connect to the Chinese
government’s goal of egalitarianism. 190 Egalitarianism “accompanied
China’s Communist revolution,” even if it did not apply in practice.191 In
particular, Mao Zedong was “obsessed with trying to create a more
egalitarian social order,” even in comparison with the Soviet Union. 192
Although Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms largely eroded Mao Zedong’s
socialist ideals after the Cultural Revolution, current President Xi Jinping
demonstrated an “egalitarian streak” in addressing concerns over the
growing wealth gap in China.193 This includes his clampdown against lavish
spending by the government, excessive waste of food, and political
corruption.194 Similarly, although a “clear tension” exists between the elitist
and egalitarian principles in Confucianism,195 the philosophy does place a
“very high priority on the welfare of the citizenry.”196 As a result, the
current application of benevolent Confucian principles in China should be
extended to all criminals potentially facing the death penalty, not just those
with power or money.
Equality before the law is both an international human rights norm197
and an important feature in the Criminal Law. Article 4 states that the “law
shall be applied equally to anyone who commits a crime,”198 stressing that
“no one shall have the privilege of transcending the law.”199 Ideally, this
would prevent individuals from evading negative repercussions by
exploiting their high social or political privileges.
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Under the Chinese Criminal Law, both economic and violent crimes
can merit the death penalty.200 Article 48 of the Criminal Law states that the
death penalty “shall only be applied to criminals who have committed
extremely serious crimes.”201 Courts can grant death penalty sentences for
economic crimes like embezzling more than 100,000 yuan,202 as well as
violent crimes such as homicide203 or rape204 in certain circumstances. The
Criminal Law does not distinguish between violent and economic crimes in
capital cases, allowing a two-year suspension of execution if the court does
not deem immediate execution necessary, and mandating that all death
sentences be submitted to the SPC for verification and approval.205 In a
2006 opinion, the SPC emphasized the need to differentiate treatment of
convicted criminals, requiring courts to look at “both the offense’s harm to
society and the individual characteristics of the defendant.”206 However, this
recommendation appears to benefit only corrupt government officials for
whom the death penalty is a possibility, but almost never a reality.207
Judges’ use of benevolent principles in death penalty cases for corrupt
government officials but not for others, in spite of the identical legal
frameworks that govern both, violates the right of equality before the law.
Although Communist China initially rejected Confucianism as propagating
elitism and hierarchal authoritative structures, 208 Confucian principles of
benevolence and humaneness remain a strong influence on modern Chinese
law.209 Recently, China attempted to balance severity with leniency by
decreasing death penalty application. 210 However, the failure to apply
benevolent principles to all those who commit crimes that may result in the
death penalty211 betrays both the Chinese legal traditions of leniency and the
Communist goal of equality under the law.212 Despite A) China’s recent
attempts to curb its usage of the death penalty, B) courts do not apply
benevolent principles in all cases of violent crime, C) resulting in an unequal
200
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application of the death penalty that proves inconsistent with the Chinese
legal and cultural tradition.
A.

China’s Attempts to Decrease the Use of the Death Penalty in Recent
Years Indicates Mindfulness of the Balance of Severity and Leniency

Although scholars and lawmakers continue to debate how to properly
balance leniency with severity,213 the Chinese government’s recent measures
“aimed at reducing the number of capital sentences” evidences its efforts to
implement this balance.214 The SPC issued a 2010 report directing lowerlevel courts to “ensure the death penalty only applies to a very small number
of criminals who have committed extremely serious crimes,” and to limit
sentences mandating immediate execution.215 In 2011, China reduced the
number of offenses punishable by death from sixty-eight to fifty-five.216
This reduction mainly eliminated the death penalty for certain economic and
non-violent offenses, such as smuggling cultural relics, and gave provincial
courts the option of granting two-year suspended death sentences217 if the
courts do not deem immediate execution necessary.218 If an inmate behaves
well during the two years, his or her sentence can be commuted to life,
which generally amounts to a twenty-five year sentence.219 In addition, the
SPC aimed to strengthen and limit the application of the death penalty by
reforming the trial procedures for death penalty appeal cases, as well as
detailing rules on conducting death penalty review and specific evidence
rules.220
However, critics point out the rarity of an appeals court overturning a
lower court’s death penalty sentence.221 Furthermore, economic crimes such
as tax fraud, smuggling of cultural relics, and tomb robbing rarely results in
213

Jianhong Liu et al., supra note 34 at 28.
Keith B. Richburg, In China, Some are Rethinking the Death Penalty, WASH. POST (June 25,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/in-china-some-are-rethinking-death-penalty/
2011/06/22/AGY6gqkH_story.html.
215
Id.
216
Hogg, supra note 42.
217
Richburg, supra note 214.
218
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 刑 法 ) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar.
14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 48 (China), translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.
219
Id.
220
JIANFU CHEN, supra note 15, at 52-53.
221
Teng Biao: “In China, Courts are Told What Decision to Make in Important Cases, Including on
the Death Penalty”, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/teng-biao-chinacourts-are-told-what-decision-make-important-cases-including-death-penalty-2013 (last visited Apr. 23,
2014).
214

JUNE 2014

THE UNEQUAL ADMINISTRATION OF DEATH IN CHINA

889

the death penalty. 222 Amnesty International criticized the reduction in
crimes punishable by death as “legal housekeeping,” 223 although it is
possible that legislators concluded that these crimes involve less harm than
violent crimes and thus do not merit the death penalty.224 Yet, the fact that
China’s executions still number in the thousands demonstrates that China
may not have succeeded in substantially lowering the number of executions
each year.225
B.

Courts Do Not Apply Benevolent Principles to All Persons Accused of
Violent Crimes, Including Non-Public Officials Who Allegedly Killed
in Self-Defense

Hou Qinzhi became the first person to benefit from the provincial
courts’ ability to sentence people to a two-year suspended execution.226 A
court convicted him of stabbing an inspector during a brawl.227 Courts have
not applied the same benevolence, however, in all cases involving violent
crimes. For example, in September 2013, the SPC upheld the death penalty
for Xia Junfeng, a street vendor who claimed that he had stabbed two local
officials to death in self-defense after they repeatedly beat him.228 Although
the Court ruled that there was no evidence of self-defense,229 Xia Junfeng’s
case sparked backlash from thousands of people, including human rights
lawyers in China who stated that the uncertainty in the case should have
prevented the SPC from approving an immediate execution.230 Although
legal experts identified holes in the prosecution’s case, including a lack of
credible witnesses and contradictory statements, the state executed Xia
Jungfeng.231
222
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In addition, in 2012 the government executed Li Yan for murdering
her husband who frequently beat her and inflicted other abuse, such as
cutting off one of her fingers, stubbing cigarettes out on her face, and
locking her outside in the freezing Sichuan winter for hours.232 Li Yan
sought help several times from the police who took photographs of her
injuries, but otherwise did nothing.233 When Li Yan asked local justice
department officials about a divorce, they told her that she would be left
destitute unless her husband agreed to one, so “she was better off tolerating
the abuse.”234 The local women’s federation and neighborhood committees
merely informed her that they could not intervene in family disputes.235
Three months after her final failed attempt to get help, Li Yan killed her
husband after he drunkenly threatened to shoot her and subsequently beat
and kicked her.236 Li Yan claimed the accidental killing occurred when she
hit him over the head with the gun barrel to stop his abuse.237 In 2013, the
SPC approved Li Yan’s death sentence238 despite outrage239 from tens of
thousands of people both within and outside China who called for the halt of
her execution.240
Li Yan’s case is one of many whereas Hou Qinzhi’s good fortune is
rare. Chinese courts have perpetrated a troubling trend of executing or
jailing thousands of domestic violence victims who killed or injured their
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abusive husbands.241 Approximately eighty percent of the female prisoners
in Fuzhou, Fujian province and sixty percent of female prisoners in Anshan,
Liaoning province convicted of killing or injuring their husbands were
domestic violence victims.242 Out of the 121 women in Sichuan prison
convicted of killing or injuring their husbands, seventy-one were given
suspended death sentences or life imprisonment and twenty-eight were jailed
for at least ten years.243 Li Yan’s situation is illustrative of a disturbing
tendency by the courts to punish victims without taking into account the
circumstances of the crime.
C.

Unequal Application of Confucian Benevolence and Humanness
Proves Inconsistent with Chinese Legal and Cultural Values

Modern China utilizes Confucian principles of benevolence in its
criminal justice system.244 However, an inherent dissonance exists between
exercising Confucian mercy and humanism for government officials by
handing down mitigated punishments, but not doing so for others. Although
many public officials’ crimes involve bribery, embezzlement, or
collaboration scams with other officials,245 many public officials and other
politically-connected individuals are treated more leniently even after
committing murder.246 Not only does this betray the Chinese legal tradition
of balancing severity with mercy, but only applying benevolence to those in
power completely undermines the Communist Party’s current attempts to
remedy growing social inequality.247
Leniency for public officials is codified into law. For example, the
2011 Criminal Law amendment introduced a stipulation that criminals found
guilty of murder, rape, or kidnapping who had their death sentences
commuted must serve at least twenty-seven years in prison.248 In contrast,
public officials convicted of embezzlement or bribery and given suspended
death sentences are not included in the scope of the amendment. 249
According to the Criminal Law, public officials with suspended death
241
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sentences will only serve thirteen years in prison; however, they may be
released even earlier.250 Similarly, many Chinese scholars share the view
that the death penalty is “an inappropriate form of punishment for economic
crimes.”251 Statistics from one province indicate that ninety percent of death
penalties are imposed for crimes such as murder, robbery, rape, serious
bodily injuries, and major thefts.252 However, scholars also acknowledge
that, while abolition of the death penalty may be politically unrealistic, “the
problem . . . is not just that it is too common; its application lacks strict
control.”253
Concerns about a lack of strict control manifest in the unequal
application of sentencing procedures in embezzlement and bribery crimes.
Although a court can sentence an individual who embezzles more than
100,000 yuan254 to death if the crime is deemed “especially serious,”255
courts often do not invoke this option in cases concerning public officials.256
Song Chenguang, a senior political advisor, and Han Guizhi, the former head
of the advisory body of Heilongjiang province, were both convicted of
accepting bribes and received the suspended death sentence. 257 Former
chairman of the state-run oil company, Sinopec Chen Tonghai, was also
given a suspended death sentence in 2009 for accepting bribes totaling about
195.73 million yuan. 258 Zheng Ziansheng, head of the Mingzhen
Management Committee, was sentenced to a suspended death sentence for
embezzling over one hundred million yuan and accepting over twenty
million yuan in bribes. 259 Suspended death sentences are normally
commuted to life imprisonment; therefore, officials receiving this sentence
are not expected to face execution.260 Furthermore, public officials with
suspended death sentences will only serve thirteen years in prison, perhaps
250
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less.261 In contrast, courts appear willing to execute private citizens under
the same law.262 For example, former senior trader at a Chinese securities
company, Yang Yanming, was executed for embezzling and
misappropriating 94.5 million yuan in 2009,263 and former CEO of a stateowned gold and silver refinery, Song Wendai, was executed in 2012 for
embezzling eighty-seven million yuan.264 Currently, the average sum of
money involved in corruption cases involving high-ranking officials is
10 million yuan, or USD 1.6 million.265 Although many public officials’
embezzlement and bribery convictions surpass the death penalty’s statutory
threshold, their crimes often do not result in a death penalty sentence.266
Given the fact that private citizens have been executed for embezzlement267
but many officials have not, 268 Chinese courts appear to be utilizing
Confucian principles of benevolence in their choice not to execute these
officials.
The predominant group sentenced to death is composed of people
with little education and social standing. 269 Chinese lawyers note that
“capital punishment is linked to social inequality.”270 Of note is the fact that
courts impose the death penalty most often for violent crimes when civilians
clashed with government or law enforcement officials.271 This difference
appears gendered as well, since most women convicted of killing their
husbands serve life sentences whereas most men who beat their wives serve
only several years.272 In 2009, for example, police in the Dong Shanshan
case dismissed all eight reports of domestic violence as “family
261
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problems.”273 After beating his wife to death, the husband merely received a
jail sentence of six and a half years for “maltreatment.”274 Compared with
Li Yan, who murdered her husband in self-defense after enduring extreme
abuse,275 this treatment is just one instance in a trend where men and women
who kill their spouses do not receive similar sentences.276
Courts unequally apply Confucian benevolence in cases comparing
the treatment of public officials or people of influence who commit murder
and “lowly” common people who commit murder.277 Food vendor Xia
Junfeng, convicted of “intentional homicide,”278 was executed for killing
two officials allegedly in self-defense.279 In contrast, local officials who
killed watermelon vendor Deng Zhengia during a violent dispute received
sentences ranging from 3.5 to 11 years in prison for “intentional injury.”280
Parallel to Xia Junfeng’s situation, a fight escalated from Deng Zhengia’s
resistance of the local officials’ enforcement of an urban code 281 and
eyewitnesses observed the entire proceeding.282 Although witnesses assert
that an official struck Deng Zhengia on the head with a weight from his
hand-held scale, police stated that Deng Zhengia merely “unexpectedly fell
to the ground and died.”283 Just as the courts discounted holes in the case
against Xia Junfeng that may have indicated his acts of self-defense were
justified,284 the facts and surrounding circumstances were ignored here.
Comparatively, Gu Kailai, the wife of a former high-ranking
Communist Party leader and daughter of a “celebrated revolutionary,”285
committed premeditated murder over a commercial disagreement.286 Gu
273

Id.
Id.
275
Teng Biao: “In China, Courts are Told What Decision to Make in Important Cases, Including on
the Death Penalty”, supra note 221; See Verna Yu, supra note 235.
276
Kim Lee, supra note 272.
277
See China Executes Street Vendor Xia Junfeng for Murder, Sparking Cries of Double-Standards
of Justice, supra note 229.
278
Mimi Lau, supra note 9.
279
Id.
280
Four Officials Convicted over Death of Watermelon Vendor in Hunan, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1391059/four-chinese-officials-convicted-overdeath-watermelon-vendor-hunan (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
281
Id.
282
Andrew Jacobs, Death of Watermelon Vendor Sets off Outcry in China, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/asia/death-in-china-stirs-anger-over-urban-rule-en
forcers.html?_r=0.
283
Id.
284
Chinese Father Who Stabbed Two Officials to Death in ‘Self-Defence’ is Executed despite Public
Outcry, supra note 228.
285
China Killers Unequal in Life and Death, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/
chinarealtime/2013/09/25/unequal-in-life-and-death (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
286
Chinese Father Who Stabbed Two Officials to Death in ‘Self-Defence’ is Executed despite Public
Outcry, supra note 228.
274

JUNE 2014

THE UNEQUAL ADMINISTRATION OF DEATH IN CHINA

895

Kailai killed a British businessman by pouring rat poison and cyanide mixed
with water down his throat.287 Gu Kailai, whose mental state was taken into
account by the court,288 was given the suspended death sentence, which will
be commuted to life in prison.289 However, Gu Kailai could be released
from jail after serving nine years on medical parole grounds.290 In contrast,
despite the fact that the officials Xia Junfeng killed have a “reputation for
heavy-handed enforcement of city ordinances,” 291 the SPC found no
evidence of self-defense in his case.292 Although both Xia Junfeng and Gu
Kailai expressed remorse and cited self-defense, only Xia Junfeng received
the death penalty. 293 Not executing Gu Kailai for an admittedly
premeditated murder but executing Xia Junfeng in a case where the facts are
in dispute can be attributed to Gu Kailai’s class background of hailing “from
China’s elite” whereas Xia Junfeng comes “from the nation’s masses.”294
The Chinese legal tradition consists of both severe punishment295 and
mercy.296 Chinese citizens founded modern China because they were not
content with societal structures that oppressed the less privileged. 297
Although the government touts deterrence as a primary goal of China’s
criminal justice system,298 the justification that death penalty deters crime
appears to only apply to those who lack a certain social, economic, or
political status. Although Xia Junfeng and Gu Kailai both killed a person,
allegedly in self-defense, only the politically connected criminal still lives
today.299 Contrary to Chinese legal traditions of benevolence300 and equality
under the law,301 the courts only applied legal mercy to one of “China’s
elite.”302 Furthermore, given the circumstances surrounding Li Yan’s crime,
executing domestic violence victims would not likely deter this particular
287
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crime.303 Exercising Confucian principles of benevolence and humaneness
in crimes for public officials, but not for those without political or financial
power, contradicts both China’s strong cultural values and the goal of
equality under the law.
V.

SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN CHINA’S
UNEQUAL DEATH PENALTY POLICY AND LEGAL TRADITION

The law does not exist in a vacuum; China’s death penalty policy
reflects both the social and political climate of the time.304 Even Chinese
scholars now admit that “you cannot prove [the death penalty’s]
effectiveness.”305 Furthermore, since deterrence does not conclusively deter
crime, the Chinese government should not punish non-government officials
more severely. Since the courts apply Confucian principles of benevolence
to crimes committed by those in power, the courts should also extend these
principles to everyone else.
Since this inequality in the administration of the death penalty often
occurs at the policymaking and lower court levels, there are several steps
that could rectify this problem. The Chinese government could balance
severity and humanness by A) increasing transparency in court decisions in
death penalty review cases, B) mandating a wider amount of mitigating
factors for each individual case to ensure an appropriate sentence, and
C) establishing a formal clemency process where those sentenced to death
can seek pardon or commutation of their sentence after all judicial appeals
are exhausted.
A.

Greater Transparency Regarding SPC Decisions in Death Penalty
Cases Would Improve Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing

The SPC should increase the transparency of their decisions so that
lawyers, defendants, the media, and the general public understand the basis
of their decision to strike down or uphold a capital sentence. The judicial
system is “famously opaque, and details of the court proceedings remain
impossible to verify.”306 The mystery surrounding the SPC’s death penalty
303
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review process led to uncertainty regarding the fairness and suitability of the
review process.307
Nevertheless, the SPC should release their deliberations and reasoning
for many types of capital sentence review cases, including both economic
and non-economic crimes. Releasing this information would be useful for
the lower courts so that they could effectively guard against unjust or overly
punitive capital sentences, and it would allow parties concerned with China’s
death penalty policy to examine any discrepancies in sentencing
procedures. 308 Given the ambiguity in some of the statutory language,
examples of what exactly constitutes a minor, relatively minor, severe, or
relatively severe mitigating factor 309 would aid lower courts in properly
taking those factors into consideration. Perhaps the court in Li Yan’s case
considered an unknown factor that lead to the decision to uphold her
sentence in the face of seemingly apparent mitigating factors. Without any
way to determine the basis of the SPC’s decision, all that is left is a sense
that an injustice occurred, which demonstrates a greater, troubling trend.
B.

Greater Usage of Mitigation Factors in Any Individual Case Ensures
Appropriate Punishment and Crime Deterrence

Amnesty International noted in a 1998 report that Chinese courts do
not take mitigating circumstances into account when sentencing criminals.310
In particular, legal experts state that judges tend to overlook the mental state
of the defendants during the commission of the crime.311 For example, Xie
Shuigui received the death penalty after arranging the murder of her older
brother, who used to rape and beat her, while Zhang Hanbin was executed
for killing his son.312 Zhang Hanbin tried to kill himself and his son after a
series of tragic events left them unable to survive much longer.313 The
Criminal Law includes statutory mitigating factors such as age, pregnancy,
mental capacity, or physical disability.314 Additionally, an SPC 2006 opinion
307
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directed courts to consider both the crime’s harm to society and the
particularized characteristics of the defendant during sentencing.315 While
this mandate from China’s highest court calls for the use of mitigation
factors, they may not be utilized in practice. Judges have a tendency not to
consider mitigating factors such as the mental state of the defendant,
particularly in non-economic crimes.316
However, judges should be able to identify “crime[s] of a particularly
severe nature” in order to properly calculate mitigating factors in
sentencing.317 Certain scholars propose that the severity of economic crimes
should be determined by examining the enormity of the crime, severity of
personal injury and death, damaged caused to property, and the degree of
subjective evil character.318 In order to remain true to the spirit of Article 4
in the Criminal Law,319 courts should also carefully consider evidentiary
factors in non-economic crimes. Since the death penalty appears to exercise
no conclusive deterrent effect on the commission of future crimes,320 the
courts have no excuse to punish non-economic crimes much more harshly.
Instead, the courts must ensure that the ultimate sentence is punitive to the
appropriate degree.
C.

Establish a Clemency Process to Seek Pardon or Commutation of a
Death Sentence Consistent with International Humanitarian Norms

Many international instruments mandate the right to seek clemency
through pardon or commutation of sentence after the exhaustion of judicial
appeals, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,321 to which China is a signatory, but not a party.322 This respected
right is so widespread that it is considered a rule of customary international
law. 323 Imperial China frequently utilized the practice of widespread
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amnesties absolving criminals for all crimes,324 and at least had an informal
means to petition the emperor325 in its history. However, no procedure
currently exists under Chinese criminal law for those sentenced to the death
penalty to seek pardon or commutation of their sentence.326
Concerns such as the commonplace usage of forced confessions that
lead to miscarriages of justice and potential lack of access to defense
attorneys at all stages of the process necessitates a meaningful clemency
process. 327 This clemency process should not “become a meaningless
formality without genuine consideration for the case.”328 Achieving a fair
and substantive review of an applicant’s case by the courts requires allowing
the applicant to raise any considerations that they find relevant, including
issues that may not have been raised in the original court proceedings.329
Furthermore, the applicant should remain informed about their case and the
execution must not take place before the clemency proceedings conclude.330
VI.

CONCLUSION

An inconsistency exists with the Chinese Communist Party’s
campaign to address societal inequality and the legal tradition of balancing
Confucian humanness and Legalist severity when the courts fail to exercise
leniency for people who are not government officials or part of “China’s
elite.”331 Article 4 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China
created a statutory requirement that the law apply equally to all, regardless
of privilege. Studies cannot conclusively prove that the death penalty
actually deters crime. Furthermore, Confucian principles have endured in
spite of Communist China’s initial rejection of the philosophy, manifesting
in statutory and procedural mechanisms that promote benevolence in the
criminal justice system. Imperial China granted Confucian legal mercy
included all citizens. This benevolence works in conjunction with
Communist China’s foundational goal of working to cease the exploitation
of the many by the few in power because it extends the privilege of legal
mercy to all citizens.
Only applying legal mercy for the most final of punishments—death—
to people with power encompasses exactly the inequality modern China was
324
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founded to counteract.332 Public officials or well-connected individuals with
political power receive the suspended death sentence for corruption and
receive lighter penalties for acts of premeditated murder. On the other hand,
an abused wife and a man who murdered his assailant after being repeatedly
beaten were executed. This inequality encompasses neither the balance of
humanness and severity utilized in imperial China, nor the egalitarianism
sought by those who founded modern China. Since the Chinese criminal
justice system primarily aims to deter crime,333 the fact that more death
penalty sentences has not been proven to deter crime means that no
justification exists in executing people without considering mitigation
factors. Otherwise, the courts focus solely on punitive harshness, rather than
actual reform and deterrence.
While the Chinese criminal justice system introduced several
procedural and substantive reforms that aim to improve accountability and
appropriate sentencing, an inequality still remains as to whom these reforms
are applied. China can take several measures to improve equitable
sentencing procedures: 1) increasing transparency by releasing SPC
guidance cases concerning the death penalty so it is clear what constitute
especially egregious crimes judicially interpreted to be worthy of the death
penalty, 2) mandate the utilization of mitigation factors and examine the
context of the crime as a whole for all cases, and 3) establish a formal
clemency process to seek a pardon after exhausting all judicial appeals.
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